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The emergence of cooperation in populations of selfish individuals is a fascinating topic that
has inspired much work in theoretical biology. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in a
model where individuals are characterized by phenotypic properties that are visible to others. The
population is well-mixed in the sense that everyone is equally likely to interact with everyone else,
but the behavioral strategies can depend on distance in phenotype space. We study the interaction
of cooperators and defectors. In our model, cooperators cooperate with those who are similar
and defect otherwise. Defectors always defect. Individuals mutate to nearby phenotypes, which
generates a random walk of the population in phenotype space. Our analysis bring together ideas
from coalescence theory and evolutionary game dynamics. We obtain a precise condition for natural
selection to favor cooperators over defectors. Cooperation is favored when the phenotypic mutation
rate is large and the strategy mutation rate is small. In the optimal case for cooperators, in a
one-dimensional phenotype space and for large population size, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is
given by b/c = 1 + 2/
√
3. We also derive the fundamental condition for any two-strategy symmetric
game and consider high-dimensional phenotype spaces.
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory is the study of frequency-dependent selection [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Fitness values
depend on the relative abundance, or frequency, of various strategies in the population, for example the frequency
of cooperators and defectors. Evolutionary game theory has been applied to understand the evolution of cooperative
interactions in viruses, bacteria, plants, animals and humans [9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. The classical approach to evolutionary
game dynamics assumes well-mixed populations, where every individual is equally likely to interact with every other
individual [4]. Recent advances include the extension to populations that are structured by geography or other factors
[14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25].
The term ‘greenbeard effect’ was coined in sociobiology to describe the result of the following thought experiment
[26, 27]. What evolutionary dynamics will occur if a single gene is responsible for both a phenotypic signal (‘a
green beard’) and a behavioral response (for example, altruistic behavior towards individuals with like phenotypes)?
Later, the term ‘armpit effect’ was introduced [28] to refer to a self-referent phenotype that is used in identifying kin
[29, 30, 31].
Both of these concepts are now seen as cases of ‘tag-based cooperation’, in which a generic system of phenotypic tags
is used to indicate similarity or difference, and the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation are studied in the context of
these tags. A first approach, based on computer simulations, assumed a well-mixed population, a continuum of tags,
and an evolving threshold distance for cooperation [32]. More recent models use numerical and analytic methods and
often combine tags with viscous population structure [33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. A general finding of these papers is that it is
difficult to obtain cooperation in tag-based models for well-mixed populations, indicating that some spatial structure
is needed [14].
Inspired by work on tag-based cooperation [32, 33, 34, 38] and building on a previous approach [39], we study
evolutionary game dynamics in a model where the behavior depends on phenotypic distance [40, 41]. As a particular
example we explore the evolution of cooperation [42, 43]. Studies of different organisms, including humans, support
the idea that cooperation is more likely among similar individuals [31, 44, 45, 46]. Our model applies to situations
where individuals tend to like those who have similar attitudes and beliefs. We introduce a novel yet natural model
in which individuals mutate to adjacent phenotypes in a possibly multi-dimensional phenotype space. We study one
and infinitely many dimensions in detail. We develop a theory for general evolutionary games, not just the evolution
of cooperation. Spatial structure is not needed for cooperation to be favored in our model. Moreover, in contrast to
previous work [39], we develop an analytic machinery for describing heterogeneous populations in phenotype space.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we give an overview of the main results and provide a heuristic
derivation. Then we derive the precise condition for cooperation to be favored. This condition depends on certain
correlations in the neutral case, that is when each individual has the same fitness. These correlations are calculated
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FIG. 1: The basic geometry of evolution in phenotype space. There are two types of individuals (red and blue), which
can refer to arbitrary traits or different strategies in an evolutionary game. Individuals inherit the strategy of their parent
subject to a small mutation rate u. Moreover, each individual has a phenotype. Here we consider a discrete one dimensional
phenotype space. An individual of phenotype i produces offspring of phenotype i − 1, i or i + 1 with probabilities v, 1 − 2v
and v, respectively. The total population (of size N) performs a random walk in phenotype space with diffusion coefficient
v. Sometimes the cluster breaks into two or more pieces, but typically only one of them survives. If evolutionary updating
occurs according to a Wright-Fisher process then the distribution of individuals in phenotype space has a standard deviation
of
√
2Nv. For the Moran process, the standard deviation is reduced to
√
Nv.
in Section III, and in Section IV the condition for cooperation is derived. We relegate some details to the appendices.
Finite population sizes are discussed in Appendix A, cooperation without self interaction in Appendix B, and the
derivation of correlations in Appendix C. In Appendix D we show that all results in the large population size limit
are identical for the W-F and for the Moran process. In Appendix E we consider general payoff matrices, and finally
in Appendix F we discuss an infinite dimensional phenotype space.
II. OVERVIEW OF MAIN RESULTS
Consider a population of asexual haploid individuals, with a population size N that is constant over time. Each
individual is characterized by a phenotype, given by an integer i that can take any value from minus to plus infinity.
Thus, this phenotype space is a one-dimensional and unbounded lattice. Individuals inherit the phenotype of their
parent subject to some small variation. If the parent’s phenotype is i, then the offspring has phenotype i − 1, i or
i+ 1 with probabilities v, 1− 2v and v, respectively. The parameter v can vary between 0 and 1/2.
Let us consider a Wright-Fisher process. In each generation, all individuals produce the same large number of
offspring. The next generation of N individuals is sampled from this pool of offspring. To introduce some fundamental
concepts and quantities, we first study the model without any selection. No evolutionary game is yet being played,
and there is only neutral drift in phenotype space. The entire population performs a random walk with a diffusion
coefficient v, and by this process will tend to disperse over the lattice. In opposition to this, all of the individuals in
the population will be, to some degree, related due to reproduction in a finite population. Thus, while occasionally
the population may break up into two or more clusters, typically there is only a single cluster [47, 48]. The standard
deviation of the distribution in phenotype space, which is a measure for the width of the cluster, is
√
2Nv.
Next, we superimpose the neutral drift of two types: the strategies A and B (Fig. 1). Still for the moment assuming
no fitness differences, we have reproduction subject to mutation between A and B. Specifically, with probability u the
offspring adopts a random strategy. The mutation-reproduction process defines a stationary distribution [49]. If u is
very small relative to N , the population tends to be either all-A or all-B. If u is large, the population tends toward
one half A and one half B. Figure 2 illustrates the random walk in phenotype space of the population comprised of
the two types A and B.
Using coalescence theory [50, 51] many interesting and relevant properties of the distributions of both the strategies
and phenotypic tags can be calculated. For example, the probability that two randomly chosen individuals have the
same phenotype is z = 1/
√
8Nv. The probability that two randomly chosen individuals have the same strategy and
the same phenotype is g = z(1 − Nu/2). The probability that two individuals have the same strategy and a third
individual has the same phenotype as the second is h = z[1−Nu(2 +√3)/4]. These results hold for large population
3FIG. 2: Random walks in phenotype space. The figure shows two computer simulations of a Wright-Fisher process in a one-
dimensional discrete phenotype space. The phenotypic mutation rate is v = 0.25. The colors, red and blue, refer to arbitrary
traits, because no game is yet being played. All individuals have the same fitness. The population size is (a) N = 10 and
(b) N = 100. The strategy mutation probability (between red and blue) is u = 0.004. Therefore, a given color dominates on
average for 2/u = 500 generations (since new mutations arrive at rate Nu/2 and fixate with probability 1/N). The standard
deviation of the distribution in phenotype space is
√
2Nv. About 95% of all individuals are within 4 standard deviations.
Often the population fragments into two or several pieces, but only one branch survives in the long run. We use the statistics
of these neutral ‘phenotypic space walks’ for calculating the fundamental conditions of evolutionary games in the limit of weak
selection.
size N and small mutation rate u; more precisely, we assume large Nv and small Nu. The relevance of z, g and h
will become clear below. The expressions for z, g and h are derived for general Nv and Nu in Section III, where they
appear as eqs (12), (21) and (26), respectively.
We can now use these insights to study game dynamics. We investigate the competition of cooperators, C, and
defectors, D. Cooperators play a conditional strategy: they cooperate with all individuals who are close enough in
phenotype space and defect otherwise. The notion of being close enough is modeled by a lattice structure. In particular,
a cooperator with phenotype i cooperates only with other individuals of phenotype i. Defectors, in contrast, play an
unconditional strategy: they always defect. Cooperation means paying a cost, c, for the other individual to receive a
benefit b. The larger the total payoff of an individual, interacting equally with every member of the population, the
larger the number of offspring it will produce on average. We want to calculate the critical benefit-to-cost ratio, b/c,
that allows the game in phenotype space to favor the evolution of cooperation.
A configuration of the population is specified by mi and ni, which are the number of cooperators with phenotype
i and the total number of individuals with phenotype i, respectively. The total payoff of all cooperators is FC =∑
imi(bmi − cni). The total payoff of all defectors is FD =
∑
i(ni − mi)bmi. There are
∑
imi cooperators and
N −∑imi defectors. The average payoff for a cooperator is fC = FC/∑imi. The average payoff for a defector is
fD = FD/(N−
∑
imi). Cooperators have a higher fitness than defectors if fC > fD, which leads to
∑
imi(bmi−cni) >∑
imi
∑
jmjnj(b − c)/N . Averaging these quantities over every possible configuration of the population, weighted
4!
!
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FIG. 3: Excellent agreement between numerical simulations and analytic calculations. We show the critical benefit-to-cost ratio
that is needed for cooperators to be more abundant than defectors in the stationary distribution. We have used a Wright-Fisher
process with a phenotypic mutation rate v = 1/2 and a strategy mutation probability u = 1/(2N). The red line indicates the
result of our analytic calculation. For these parameter values the asymptotic limit for large N is b/c = (1 + 12
√
2)/7 ≈ 2.5672.
The red dots indicate the result of numerical simulations. The grey line illustrates the critical b/c-ratio for u → 0 with the
asymptotic limit b/c = 1 + 2/
√
3 ≈ 2.1547.
by their stationary probability under neutrality, we obtain the fundamental condition
b
〈∑
i
m2i
〉
− c
〈∑
i
mini
〉
> (b− c)
〈∑
ij
mimjnj
〉
/N. (1)
Under this condition cooperators are more abundant than defectors in the mutation-selection process. The above
argument and our results are valid in the weak selection limit. A precise derivation of this inequality is presented in
Section IV. Correlation terms similar to the ones above sometimes arise in studies of social behavior and population
dynamics [26, 52]. The first two terms in inequality (1) are pairwise correlations, while the third is notably a triplet
correlation. Note that the argument leading to inequality (1) includes self-interaction, but that the effect of this
becomes negligible when N is large.
When the population size is large, the averages in inequality (1) are proportional to the probabilities g, z and h
respectively, which we introduced earlier. Consequently, inequality (1) can be written as bg − cz > (b − c)h. Using
the values of z, g, h given above we obtain
b/c > 1 +
2√
3
, (2)
which is approximately 2.16. If the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds this number, then cooperators are more abundant
than defectors in the mutation-selection process. The success of cooperators results from the balance of movement
and clustering in phenotype space. Inequality (2) represents the condition for cooperators to be more abundant than
defectors in a large population when the strategy mutation rate u is small (Nu  1) and the phenotypic mutation
rate v is large (Nv  1). We derive conditions for any population size and mutation rates. Figure 3 shows the
excellent agreement between numerical simulations and analytical calculations. In general we find that both lowering
strategy mutations, and increasing phenotypic mutations favor cooperators.
III. CORRELATIONS IN THE NEUTRAL CASE
Let us give a more precise definition of the model first. Consider a population of N haploid individuals (players).
Each individual k = 1, . . . , N has an integer-valued phenotype Xk ∈ Z, which we also refer to as its position in
phenotype space. Additionally, each individual has a strategy Sk ∈ {0, 1}, and we refer to these two strategies as
cooperation (1) and defection (0). In general, players’ phenotypes and strategies determine their fitness. In the
Wright-Fisher (W-F) process, each of the N individuals of the next generation independently chooses a parent from
5the previous generation with a probability proportional to the parent’s fitness. Each offspring inherits the parent’s
position (phenotype) with probability 1 − 2v, and it is placed to either the left or the right neighboring position of
the parent, both with probability v. Each offspring also inherits the parent’s strategy with probability 1− u, and it
adopts a random strategy with probability u.
In this section we consider the neutral case, that is when all players have the same fitness. Note that the strategies
and the phenotypes of the individuals change independently, and evolve according to the Wright-Fisher process
[47, 48]. The system rapidly reaches a stationary state where the individuals stay in a cluster with variance 2Nv,
but the cluster as a whole diffuses over the space (the integers) with diffusion coefficient v. We are interested in the
properties of this stationary state.
We are particularly interested in four probabilities. We pick three distinct individuals k, q, and l from the population
in the stationary state. For their phenotypes and their strategies we define the following four probabilities
y = Pr(Sk = Sq)
z = Pr(Xk = Xq)
g = Pr(Sk = Sq, Xk = Xq)
h = Pr(Sl = Sk, Xk = Xq)
(3)
In words, y is the probability that two individuals have the same strategy, and z is the probability that they have
the same phenotype. They have simultaneously the same strategy and phenotype with probability g. Out of three
individuals, the probability that the first two have the same phenotype, and simultaneously the first and the third
have the same strategy is denoted by h. Note that neither g nor h factorizes in general.
To obtain the above probabilities we have to know the probability Pr(T = t) that the time T to the most recent
common ancestor (MRCA) of two randomly chosen individual is T = t. This time is not affected by either the
strategies or the phenotypes of the players. It is determined solely by the W-F dynamics. The ancestry of two
individuals coalesce with probability 1/N in each time step. Hence the probability that the time to the MRCA is t is
Pr(T = t) =
(
1− 1
N
)t−1 1
N
(4)
We can continue the calculation for finite system size N , but the expressions become cumbersome. Hence we
relegated the finite N calculations to Appendix A, where we mainly treat the special v = 1/2 case. In this section we
discuss the large population limit N →∞, where we introduce the rescaled time τ = t/N . In this limit we can use a
continuous time description, where the coalescent time distribution (4) is given by the density function
p(τ) = e−τ (5)
and the average coalescence time becomes τ = 1 in the new unit.
Due to the non-overlapping generations in the W-F model, each individual is a newborn and has the chance to
mutate both in strategy and phenotype space. In the large N and u, v → 0 limit, the system can be described as a
continuous time process. Strategy mutations arrive at rate µ = 2Nu and phenotype mutations at rate ν = 2Nv (in
each direction) on the ancestral line of two individuals. Note that this continuous time limit is exact for the Moran
process even for finite values of v, as it is shown in Appendix D. In the W-F model, for finite values of v we have a
discrete time random walk, but the typical number of steps goes to infinity. In that limit the discrete and continuous
time walks become identical, and hence the finite v behavior can be recovered as the ν →∞ limit.
A. Phenotypic distance
Let us first study the phenotypes of the players. Here we calculate not only z, but in general the probability that
two randomly chosen individuals k and q are at distance x in phenotype space
z(x) = Pr(Xk −Xq = x) (6)
We know that the (signed) distance between the two individuals changes by plus or minus one at rate ν, and the
distance distribution after time τ can be expressed in terms of the Modified Bessel functions [53, 54] as
ζ(x|τ) = e−2ντI|x|(2ντ) (7)
6The probability that two individuals are distance x apart is
z(x) =
∞∑
t=1
Pr(Xk −Xq = x|T = t)Pr(T = t) (8)
which becomes an integral of the corresponding density functions in the continuous time limit
z(x) =
∞∫
0
p(τ)ζ(x|τ)dτ =
∞∫
0
e−(2ν+1)τI|x|(2ντ)dτ (9)
By using the identity [55]
∞∫
0
e−ac Iγ(bc) dc =
b−γ
(
a−√a2 − b2)γ√
a2 − b2 (10)
we arrive at the probability distribution of the signed distance
z(x) =
1√
4ν + 1
(
2ν + 1−√4ν + 1
2ν
)|x|
(11)
The individuals are at the same position with probability
z ≡ z(0) = 1√
4ν + 1
(12)
Distribution (11) is of course normalized
∑∞
x=−∞ z(x) = 1, and its second moment is
∞∑
x=−∞
x2z(x) = 2ν (13)
Note that this second moment is twice the variance of the individual positions, which is exactly ν = 2Nv even for finite
N (see Appendix A). Hence the individuals stay together in a cluster of size
√
2Nv. This cluster diffuses collectively
through phenotype space. If one follows the ancestral line of an individual time τ back, its position xˆ(τ) will change
by one at rate ν/2 in each direction. Consequently, the position of the cluster has a variance proportional to time
〈xˆ2〉 = ντ = 2vt (14)
which implies a diffusive motion. The same result is valid for any finite N in the large time limit. Note that the
diffusion coefficient D = v does not depend on the population size. Since the cluster itself wanders in space, the
average number of individuals at any given site goes to zero. That is why we focus on distances in the phenotype
space (6).
B. Pair with same strategy
We are interested in the probability y that two randomly chosen individuals have the same strategy. In the
continuous time limit, strategy mutations arrive at rate µ on the ancestral lines of the two individuals. The two
individuals have the same strategy if there were no mutations, which is the case with probability e−µτ . Otherwise
there was at least one mutation, hence at least one of the players has a random strategy, so they have the same
strategy with probability 1/2. Consequently, the probability that two players have the same strategy time τ after
their MRCA is
y(τ) = e−µτ +
1
2
(
1− e−µτ) (15)
The probability y that two randomly chosen individuals have the same strategy is
y =
∞∑
t=1
Pr(Sk = Sq|T = t)Pr(T = t) (16)
7In the continuous time limit we obtain
y =
∞∫
0
p(τ)y(τ)dτ =
2 + µ
2(1 + µ)
(17)
where we have used (5) and (15).
C. Pair with same strategy and phenotype
The probability g that two randomly chosen individuals have the same phenotype and also have the same strategy
can be obtained as
g =
∞∑
t=1
Pr(Sk = Sq|T = t)Pr(Xk = Xq|T = t)Pr(T = t) (18)
Here we have used the property, that although g does not factorize in general, nevertheless for any given time t the
conditional probabilities factorize as
Pr(Sk = Sq, Xk = Xq|T = t) = Pr(Sk = Sq|T = t)Pr(Xk = Xq|T = t) (19)
The reason is that mutations occur completely independently in the strategy and the phenotype space. The corre-
sponding integral in the continuous time limit hence becomes
g =
∞∫
0
p(τ)y(τ)ζ(τ)dτ (20)
where we use the notation ζ(τ) ≡ ζ(0|τ). Note that it is also easy to obtain the analog probability where the phenotype
difference is x, but we do not consider that here. Using identity (10) again, we can evaluate the above integral
g =
1
2
√
1 + 4ν
+
1
2
√
(1 + µ)(1 + µ+ 4ν)
(21)
D. Three point correlations
Now we turn to the calculation of the three point probability h which is defined in (3). If we follow the ancestral
lines of three individuals back in time, the probability that there was no coalescence event during one update step is
(1− 1/N)(1− 2/N). Two individuals coalesce with probability 3/N · (1− 1/N). When two individual have coalesced,
the remaining two coalesce with probability 1/N during each update step. Hence the probability that the first merging
happens to any pair of individuals at time t3 ≥ 1 back in time, and the second t2 ≥ 1 before the first one is
Pr(t3, t2) =
3
N2
[(
1− 1
N
)(
1− 2
N
)]t3−1(
1− 1
N
)t2
(22)
The probability that three individual coalesce simultaneously at time t3 is
Pr(t3, 0) =
1
N2
[(
1− 1
N
)(
1− 2
N
)]t3−1
(23)
In the N →∞ limit (22) converges to the density function
p(τ3, τ2) = 3e−(3τ3+τ2) (24)
with τ3 = t3/N and τ2 = t2/N . Note that (23) does not affect the large N limit.
Let us call the scaled time when individuals q, k coalesce τqk, and when k, l coalesce τkl. With probability 1/3
individuals q, k coalesce first at τqk = τ3 and they coalesce with l at τkl = τ3 + τ2. Similarly with probability 1/3
individuals k, l coalesce first at τkl = τ3 and they coalesce with q at τqk = τ3 + τ2. If, however, l, q coalesce first with
8probability 1/3, it makes τqk = τkl = τ3 + τ2. Since we know the probability density y(τ) that two individuals with
a MRCA at time τ back have the same strategy (15), and the probability density ζ(τ) ≡ ζ(0|τ) that they are at the
same position (7), we can simply obtain the three point correlation as
h =
1
3
∞∫
0
dτ3
∞∫
0
dτ2 p(τ3, τ2) [ζ(τ3)y(τ3 + τ2) + ζ(τ3 + τ2)y(τ3) + ζ(τ3 + τ2)y(τ3 + τ2)] (25)
This integral can be evaluated by first introducing a variable for τ2 + τ3 in the last two terms of the integral, and by
using identity (10) in all three terms. We obtain
h =
(1 + µ)(3 + µ) + C1(2 + µ)− µC3
2(1 + µ)(2 + µ)
√
1 + 4ν
(26)
with the shorthand notation
Ci =
1
2
√
(i+ µ)(1 + 4ν)
i+ µ+ 4ν
(27)
By now we have obtained all the correlations in (3) in the N →∞ limit for any values of ν and µ.
IV. THRESHOLD b/c RATIO
In this section the individuals play a simplified Prisoner’s Dilemma game given by the payoff matrix
when playing against
C D
C b− c −c
payoff of
D b 0
(28)
Here b > 0 is the benefit gained from cooperators, and c > 0 is the cost payed by cooperators. We assume that all
individuals interact (in this sense the population is “well mixed”). Cooperators, however, play a conditional strategy:
they cooperate with other individuals who have the same phenotype, and they defect otherwise. Defectors always
defect. The total payoff of an individual is the sum of all payoffs that individual receives. We introduce the effective
payoff of an individual f = 1 + δ · payoff, where δ > 0 is the strength of the selection, and δ = 0 corresponds to the
neutral case discussed in Section III. Note that δ must be sufficiently small to make all fitness values positive.
We consider here the simplest possible case, where each individual also receives a payoff from self interaction.
Excluding self-interaction results in a 1/N correction, which is discussed in Appendix B. An extension to a general
payoff matrix is considered in Appendix E.
A. Fitness
Let ni denote the number of players of phenotype i, and mi the number of cooperators of phenotype i. A state of
the system is given by the vectors s = (n,m). Let fC,i and fD,i represent the (effective) payoffs of a cooperator and
a defector, respectively, of phenotype i. When self interaction is included these values are
fC,i = 1 + δ [bmi − cni]
fD,i = 1 + δ [bmi] .
(29)
Let wC,i and wD,i represent the fitness (i.e. average number of offsprings) of a cooperator and a defector of
phenotype i. After one update step (which is one generation) we obtain
wC,i =
NfC,i∑
j [mjfC,j + (nj −mj)fD,j ] (30)
9Here a cooperator is chosen to be a parent with probability given by its payoff relative to the total payoff, and this
happens N times independently in one update step. The denominator of (30) can be written as∑
j
[mjfC,j + (nj −mj)fD,j ] = N + δ(b− c)
∑
j
mjnj (31)
Therefore, in the δ → 0 limit, we obtain the fitness of a phenotype i cooperator
wC,i = 1 + δ
bmi − cni − b− c
N
∑
j
mjnj
+ O(δ2) (32)
B. Effect of selection
Let p denote the frequency of cooperators in the population. Cooperation is favored if cooperators are in the
majority at the stationary state, 〈p〉 > 1/2. The frequency of cooperators p changes during one update step due to
selection and due to mutation. In any state s of the system, the total change of cooperator frequency can be expressed
in terms of the change due to selection as
∆ptot(s) = (1− u)∆psel(s) + u
(
1
2
− p
)
(33)
Here the first term describes the change due to selection in the absence of mutation, which happens with probability
1−u. The second term stands for the effect of mutation, which happens with probability u to each player independently.
In this latter case the frequency p increases in average by 1/2 due to the introduction of random strategies, and
decreases by p due to the replacement of cooperators.
In the stationary state 〈p〉 is constant, hence the total change of frequency vanishes 〈∆p〉tot = 0. Then from (33)
we can express the average cooperator frequency with the change of frequency due to selection as
〈p〉 = 1
2
+
1− u
u
〈∆p〉sel (34)
This means that by calculating the average change of cooperator frequency, we also obtain the average cooperator
frequency. It also means that cooperators are favored 〈p〉 > 1/2 if their change due to selection is positive in the
stationary state
〈∆p〉sel > 0 (35)
Now let us perform a perturbative expansion for small selection δ  1. In a given state s = (n,m), the expected
change of p due to selection in one update step is
∆p(s) =
1
N
(∑
i
miwC,i −
∑
i
mi
)
(36)
This expression vanishes for δ = 0 for the fitness function (32). (Note that this statement is not true in general for
arbitrary models). Its Taylor expansion is
∆p(s) = 0 + δ
d∆p(s)
dδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
+ O(δ2) =
δ
N
∑
i
mi
dwC,i
dδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
+ O(δ2) (37)
We also expand the stationary probabilities of finding the system in state s
pi(s) = pi(0)(s) + δpi(1)(s) + O(δ2) (38)
where pi(0)(s) is the stationary probability in the neutral state (here we consider two states equivalent if they only
differ by translation along the phenotype space). Consequently, in the stationary state in the presence of the game,
the average change in cooperator frequency can be expressed in the leading order in terms of averages in the neutral
stationary state
〈∆p〉sel = δ
N
〈∑
i
mi
dwC,i
dδ
〉
0
+ O(δ2) (39)
10
This expression has to be positive for cooperation to be favored (35). Here the 0 subscript refers to δ = 0, that is to
an average taken in the stationary state of the neutral model 〈·〉0 =
∑
s ·pi(0)(s). More generally, one can also easily
obtain higher order terms in δ based on (37) and (38). The first derivative of the effect of selection in the stationary
state
〈∆p〉(1)sel =
d〈∆p〉sel
dδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
(40)
can be obtained from (39), by using the fitness (32) of our model, as
〈∆p〉(1)sel =
1
N
b〈∑
i
m2i
〉
0
− c
〈∑
i
mini
〉
0
− b− c
N
〈∑
i,j
mimjnj
〉
0
 (41)
The threshold model parameters are then obtained when the change 〈∆p〉(1)sel = 0, as follows from the general condition
(35) (
b
c
)∗
=
〈∑imini〉0 − 1N 〈∑i,jmimjnj〉
0
〈∑im2i 〉0 − 1N 〈∑i,jmimjnj〉
0
(42)
Hence, we have expressed the threshold b/c ratio in the small selection limit in terms of correlations in the neutral
stationary state. Note that the averages in (41) cannot be moved inside the sum, since at any given position any
stationary average is zero. Also note that all terms in (42) are of order N2.
The above derivation is valid for finite N and δ → 0. We are also interested, however, in the N → ∞ asymptotic
behavior. In that case all the above derivation can be repeated when simultaneously δN → 0.
Expression (41) for the change in cooperator frequency can be rewritten in a more intuitive way. First we express
the total payoffs of cooperators and defectors respectively as
fC =
∑
i
mifC,i = NC + δFC
fD =
∑
i
mifD,i = ND + δFD
(43)
in a given state, where FC and FD are the total payoffs without considering weak selection
FC =
∑
i
mi(bmi − cni) , FD =
∑
i
(ni −mi)bmi (44)
and NC =
∑
imi and ND = N − NC are the number of cooperators and defectors respectively. With this notation
the change in cooperator frequency (37) can be rewritten as
∆p(s) =
δ
N2
(NDFC −NCFD) + O(δ2) (45)
This expression was obtained in an intuitive way in Section II. By averaging over the stationary state we of course
recover (41).
C. Threshold value from correlations
Let us now evaluate the expected values in (42). We randomly choose three individuals k, q, and l with replacement.
All expected values in (42) can be expressed in terms of probabilities in the neutral stationary state〈∑
i
m2i
〉
0
= N2 Pr(Sk = Sq = 1, Xk = Xq) (46a)〈∑
i
mini
〉
0
= N2 Pr(Sk = 1, Xk = Xq) (46b)〈∑
i,j
mimjnj
〉
0
= N3 Pr(Sl = Sk = 1, Xk = Xq) (46c)
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The indices i and j refer to positions, while k, q and l refer to individuals. These identities are self explanatory,
nevertheless they are proven in Appendix C.
Because the two strategies are equivalent in the neutral stationary state, all expressions (46) remain valid when we
change any 1 to 0. Consequently all expressions (46) simplify to〈∑
i
m2i
〉
0
=
N2
2
Pr(Sk = Sq, Xk = Xq)〈∑
i
mini
〉
0
=
N2
2
Pr(Xk = Xq)〈∑
i,j
mimjnj
〉
0
=
N3
2
Pr(Sl = Sk, Xk = Xq)
(47)
Note that these probabilities are denoted in Section II as P2, P1, and P3 respectively. Substituting the probabilities
of (47) into (42) we arrive at the general condition expressed in terms of two and three point correlations(
b
c
)∗
=
Pr(Sl = Sk, Xk = Xq)− Pr(Xk = Xq)
Pr(Sl = Sk, Xk = Xq)− Pr(Sk = Sq, Xk = Xq) (48)
In Section III we have calculated similar probabilities defined in (3), but always for two different individuals. In
other words while in the probabilities of (47) we pick two individuals with replacement, in the quantities of (3)
two individuals were picked without replacement. We know, however, that out of two individuals we pick the same
individual twice with probability 1/N , and pick two different individuals otherwise. We also know the corresponding
probabilities when picking three individuals. With this knowledge we can express the probabilities with replacement
in (47) with the probabilities without replacement in (3) as follows
Pr(Sk = Sq, Xk = Xq) =
1
N
[(N − 1)g + 1]
Pr(Xk = Xq) =
1
N
[(N − 1)z + 1]
Pr(Sl = Sk, Xk = Xq) =
1
N2
[(N − 1)(N − 2)h+ (N − 1) (z + y + g) + 1]
(49)
Now we substitute these probabilities into condition (48) to obtain the threshold condition(
b
c
)∗
=
(N − 2)(z − h) + 1− y + z − g
(N − 2)(g − h) + 1− y − z + g (50)
The above condition (50) is exact for any finite N with self interaction. Without self interaction a O(1/N) correction
appears as discussed in Appendix B. The model of course makes no sense for N = 1, and the smallest interesting
population size is N = 2. In the N →∞ limit of (50) we also obtain a simple rule(
b
c
)∗
=
z − h
g − h (51)
Substituting the expressions (12), (21), and (26) into the above equation for z, g, and h respectively, we arrive at(
b
c
)∗
=
µC3 − (2 + µ)C1 + (1 + µ)2
µC3 + (2 + µ)C1 − (1 + µ) (52)
where we have used the shorthand notation (27). This is our main result: the exact threshold b/c ratio in the N →∞
and weak selection limit. For parameter values b/c > (b/c)∗ there are more cooperators than defectors in the system
in the long time average.
In Figure 4, we plot the exact (b/c)∗ ratio (52) as a function of µ for several values of ν. One observes that (b/c)∗
gets smaller both for smaller µ and for larger ν . Hence small strategy mutation and large phenotype mutation helps
cooperation. The large ν limit includes the finite v (phenotype changing probability) case. Note that since the cluster
size in phenotype space is
√
2Nv, the average number of individuals with the same phenotype is proportional to√
N/v, hence there are plenty of individuals to interact with even for finite v values in the large N limit.
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FIG. 4: Exact threshold b/c ratio (52) in the N → ∞ limit for several values of ν. Cooperation is most favored in the µ → 0
and ν →∞ limit, where (b/c)∗ = 1 + 2/√3.
In the ν →∞ limit (52) becomes(
b
c
)∗
=
(2 + µ)
√
1 + µ− 2(1 + µ)2 − µ√3 + µ
−(2 + µ)√1 + µ+ 2(1 + µ)− µ√3 + µ + O(
1√
ν
) (53)
which for µ→ 0 behaves as (
b
c
)∗
= 1 +
2
√
3
3
+ µ
7
√
3− 3
18
+ O(µ2) (54)
which is ≈ 2.16 in the leading order. For µ→∞ the threshold ratio (53) diverges as(
b
c
)∗
=
√
µ+ 1 + O(
1√
µ
) (55)
Conversely, in the µ→ 0 limit (52) becomes(
b
c
)∗
=
√
3(1 + 4ν)3/2 + (3 + 8ν)
√
3 + 4ν√
3(1 + 4ν)3/2 −√3 + 4ν + O(µ) (56)
This limit function diverges as 3/4ν for small ν, but converges to the constant 1 + 2/
√
3 as ν → ∞. Hence the best
scenario for cooperation is µ→ 0 and ν →∞ where (b/c)∗ = 1 + 2/√3.
The large N asymptotic results are identical for the Moran process, where we choose a random individual to die,
and another (with replacement) to reproduce with probability proportional to the player’s payoff (see Appendix D).
We would like to briefly comment on the relationship between our work and inclusive fitness or kin selection theory
[26, 36, 58]. Let R be the inverse of the r.h.s. of (48). Now we formally obtained Hamilton’s rule (b/c)∗ = 1/R. By
dividing both the numerator and the denominator in R by Pr(Xk = Xq), (we can assume that it is not zero), and
using the definition of conditional probability, we can rewrite R as
R =
Pr(Sk = Sq| Xk = Xq)− Pr(Sl = Sk| Xk = Xq)
1− Pr(Sl = Sk| Xk = Xq) (57)
Now with the notation
G = Pr(Sk = Sq| Xk = Xq), G = Pr(Sl = Sk| Xk = Xq) (58)
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we obtain R = (G − G)/(1 − G), which is in the form of usual relatedness formula. Note, however, that this G is
not the probability of identity in state (IIS) between two random individuals in the population as it usually is in
inclusive fitness theory. Instead, G is a sort of weighted average of IIS probabilities in which those who share the
same phenotype with more players are assigned a larger weight.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have derived the conditions for cooperation to be favored for games in phenotype space for any population size
and mutation rate. Figure 3 shows the excellent agreement between numerical simulations and analytical calculations.
The argument that leads to inequality (1) contains self-interaction, which means that each cooperator adds b−c to his
payoff. Typically, self-interaction is not a desirable assumption, but it does simplify the calculation. Excluding self-
interaction requires us to calculate two more correlation terms (see Appendix B). But in the limit of large population
size, the difference between the two approaches results only in a 1/N correction term for the critical benefit-to-cost
ratio. Thus, the crucial condition (2) holds for the case with and without self-interaction.
In Appendix E we expanded our analysis to study any 2 × 2 game, not only the interaction between cooperators
and defectors. Here the general payoff matrix is given by (E1). For the game in a one dimensional phenotype space
and large population size we find that C is more abundant than D if
(R− P )(1 +
√
3) > T − S. (59)
This formula can be used for evaluating any two-strategy symmetric game in a one dimensional phenotype space. We
have discussed the snow-drift game and the stag-hunt game as particular examples.
We can also study higher dimensional phenotype spaces. In general, for higher dimensions it is easier for cooperators
to overcome defectors. The intuitive reason is that in higher dimensions phenotypic identity also implies strategic
identity. In Appendix F, we show that in the limit of infinitely many dimensions, and under the same assumptions that
produced conditions (2) and (59), the crucial benefit-to-cost ratio in the Prisoner’s Dilemma converges to b/c > 1. For
general games, the equivalent result of condition (59) becomes R > P , which means the evolutionary process always
chooses the strategy with the higher payoff against itself. Our basic approach can also be adapted to continuous,
rather than discrete, phenotype spaces. In this case, no two individuals have exactly the same phenotype, but the
conditional behavioral strategy is triggered by sufficient phenotypic similarity.
In summary, we have developed a model for the evolution of cooperation based on phenotypic similarity. Our
approach builds on previous ideas of tag based cooperation, but in contrast to earlier work [33, 34, 35, 36, 37], we do
not need spatial population dynamics to obtain an advantage for cooperators. We derive a completely analytic theory
that provides general insights. We find that the abundance of cooperators in the mutation-selection equilibrium is an
increasing function of the phenotypic mutation rate and a decreasing function of the strategic mutation rate. These
observations agree with the basic intuition that higher phenotypic mutation rates reduce the interactions between
cooperators and defectors, while higher strategic mutation rates destabilize clusters of cooperators by allowing frequent
invasion of newly mutated defectors. Therefore, cooperation is more likely to evolve if the strategy mutation rate is
small and if the phenotypic mutation rate is large. In a genetic model this assumption may be fulfilled if the strategy
is encoded by one or a few genes, while the phenotype is encoded by many genes. Also in a cultural model, it can
be the case that the phenotypic mutation rates are higher than the strategic mutation rates: for example, people
might find it easier to modify their superficial appearance than their fundamental behaviors. Furthermore, we show
how the correlations between strategies and phenotypes can be obtained from neutral coalescence theory under the
assumption that selection is weak [51, 58]. Our theory can be applied to study any evolutionary game in the context
of conditional behavior that is based on phenotypic similarity or difference.
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APPENDIX A: FINITE POPULATIONS FOR v = 1/2
Here we consider the Wright-Fisher (W-F) model for finite N and v = 1/2. What makes this case simple is that
at each time step all individuals move. The probability that the time to the MRCA is t is given by (4). During t
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generations there are exactly 2t birth events in the ancestry of two individuals, and in the v = 1/2 case the phenotypic
distance between two individuals follows a simple random walk with two steps in phenotype space per one time unit.
Consequently, the distance between two siblings is always even. After some transient time the whole population will
be constrained on the same sub-lattice of even, and then odd sites. The distance distribution of two individuals k
and q, time t after their MRCA is
Pr(Xk −Xq = x|T = t) = 2−2t
(
2t
t+ x/2
)
(A1)
where again x is always even. Consequently the probability z(x) that two randomly chosen individuals are at distance
x apart can be obtained from (8)
z(x) =
1
N − 1
∞∑
t=1
(
2t
t+ x/2
)(
N − 1
4N
)t
(A2)
This sum can be evaluated using the identity
∞∑
t=1
(
2t
t+ x/2
)(a
4
)t
=
{
a√
1−a(1+√1−a) , x = 0
a|x|/2√
1−a(1+√1−a)|x| , |x| ≥ 2
(A3)
to obtain
z(x) =

1√
N + 1
x = 0
√
N
N − 1
(
N − 1
N + 2
√
N + 1
)|x|/2
|x| ≥ 2
(A4)
Hence, apart from the special x = 0 case, z(x) decays exponentially in x. For fixed distances and N → ∞ the
asymptotic behavior is z(x) = 1/
√
N + O(1/N). The second moment of the distance distribution (A4) is simply 2N .
Now we turn to the strategies of the individuals. The strategies of the two players are the same if no mutations
happened during time t to either player, which is the case with probability (1 − u)2t. Otherwise the two strategies
are the same with probability 1/2. Consequently, the conditional probability is
y(t) = (1− u)2t + 1
2
[1− (1− u)2t] = 1 + U
t
2
(A5)
where we introduce the shorthand notations
U = (1− u)2 , M = N(1− U) + U (A6)
The probability y that two randomly chosen individuals have the same strategy becomes
y =
∞∑
t=1
p(t)y(t) =
1
2
(
1 +
U
M
)
(A7)
where we have used (4) and (A5).
Similarly, using (18) we obtain the probability g that two randomly chosen individuals have both the same strategy
and the same phenotype
g =
1
2(
√
N + 1)
+
U
2
√
M
(√
N +
√
M
) (A8)
These are exact results for arbitrary number of individuals N and mutation rate u. In the N →∞ and u → 0 limit
of the formulas (A4), (A7) and (A8) with µ = 2Nu kept constant, we recover the ν →∞ limits of the corresponding
formulas (11), (17) and (21), apart from a factor two. This factor two is a peculiarity of the v = 1/2 case. Since here
the distance between individuals is always even, there must be twice as many players at a given even distance. Note
also that the variance of the cluster is 2ν both for v = 1/2 and for the continuous limit calculation.
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For only two individuals, the general condition (50) simplifies to(
b
c
)∗
N=2
=
1− y + z − g
1− y − z + g (A9)
which contains only quantities we have just calculated in this section. To obtain the exact (b/c)∗ for any other finite
N we have to use the general expression (50), and obtain h analogously to (25) and using (22) and (23). The formulas
for h and (b/c)∗ are too cumbersome to include here. We have, however, checked these formulas with computer
simulations for many values of N . We explicitly simulated the W-F process and found the threshold (b/c)∗ value
where the frequency of cooperators in the stationary state becomes larger than 1/2. Moreover, in the N →∞, u→ 0
limit with µ = 2Nu constant, we recover the continuous time formula (53).
APPENDIX B: EXCLUDING SELF INTERACTION
If cooperators cannot interact with themselves, we have
fC,i = 1 + δ [b(mi − 1)− c(ni − 1)]
fD,i = 1 + δ [bmi] .
(B1)
Therefore the fitness of cooperators at position i becomes
wC,i = 1 +
δ
N
b(mi − 1)− c(ni − 1)− b− c
N
∑
j
mj(nj − 1)
+ O(δ2) (B2)
which then leads to the expected change of cooperator frequency
〈∆p〉 = δ
N2
[
b
〈∑
i
m2i
〉
− c
〈∑
i
mini
〉
− b− c
N
〈∑
i,j
mimjnj
〉
− (b− c)
〈∑
i
mi
〉
+
b− c
N
〈∑
i,j
mimj
〉]
+ O(δ2).
(B3)
Two new correlation types in the neutral stationary state appear〈∑
i
mi
〉
= N Pr(Sk = 1) =
N
2〈∑
i,j
mimj
〉
= N2 Pr(Sk = Sq = 1) =
N2
2
y
(B4)
This then leads to the general expression analogous to (50) for the threshold ratio(
b
c
)∗
=
(N − 2)(z − h) + z − g
(N − 2)(g − h)− z + g (B5)
The smallest valid population size is N = 3. In the N → ∞ the threshold b/c ratio with self interaction (50) and
without it (B5) are the same (51) in the leading order, and their difference is only of order 1/N .
APPENDIX C: FROM AVERAGES TO CORRELATIONS
Here we obtain the identities listed in (46). The variables mi and ni are fixed in any given state. Let us use the
indicator function 1, which is 1(A) = 1 if event A is true and 1(A) = 0 if event A is false. Of course the stationary
average of the indicator function is the stationary probability of an event
〈1(A)〉 = Pr(A) (C1)
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and by 1(A,B) we mean 1(A ∩ B) = 1(A)1(B). Now in any given state we can express ni and mi by the indicator
functions
ni =
∑
k
1(Xk = i)
mi =
∑
q
1(Xq = i)1(Sq = 1).
(C2)
The sum in (46a) becomes
∑
i
mimi =
∑
k,q
[
1(Sk = 1)1(Sq = 1)
∑
i
1(Xk = i)1(Xq = i)
]
=
∑
k,q
1(Sk = Sq = 1)1(Xk = Xq) (C3)
since the sum over i is simply∑
i
1(Xk = i)1(Xq = i) =
∑
i
1(Xk = i, Xq = i) = 1(Xk = Xq). (C4)
Now taking the average of (C3) in the stationary state we obtain〈∑
i
m2i
〉
0
=
∑
k,q
〈1(Sk = Sq = 1, Xk = Xq)〉 =
∑
k,q
Pr(Sk = Sq = 1, Xk = Xq), (C5)
where we have used identity (C1). Since all individuals are equivalent in the stationary state, the above probabilities
are the same for any pair of individuals, hence from now on we consider k and q as two randomly chosen individuals,
and write 〈∑
i
m2i
〉
0
= N2 Pr(Sk = Sq = 1, Xk = Xq). (C6)
The expression (46b) can be derived similarly, since
∑
i
mini =
∑
k,q
[
1(Sq = 1)
∑
i
1(Xk = i)1(Xq = i)
]
=
∑
k,q
1(Sq = 1)1(Xk = Xq) (C7)
and taking the average of (C7) in the stationary state leads to〈∑
i
mini
〉
0
=
∑
k,q
Pr(Sq = 1, Xk = Xq) = N2 Pr(Sq = 1, Xk = Xq) (C8)
For the last expression (46c) we have
∑
i,j
mimjnj =
∑
k,q,l
[∑
i
1(Sl = 1, Xl = i)
]∑
j
1(Sk = 1, Xk = j)1(Xq = j)

=
∑
k,q,l
1(Sl = 1) 1(Sk = 1, Xk = Xq)
(C9)
which in the stationary state becomes〈∑
i,j
mimjnj
〉
0
=
∑
k,q,l
Pr(Sl = Sk = 1, Xk = Xq) = N3 Pr(Sl = Sk = 1, Xk = Xq) (C10)
17
APPENDIX D: MORAN DYNAMICS
In the Moran model we chose a random individual to die, and another (with replacement) to multiply with prob-
ability proportional to the player’s payoff. The newborn then replaces the dead individual. Otherwise the dynamics
is the same as in the W-F case. The behavior of the Moran model is also very similar to the W-F model, and the
results can be written in an identical form in the N →∞ limit, by defining the appropriate variables.
We consider the neutral case of the Moran model first. Let us obtain the probability Pr(T = t) that the time to the
most recent common ancestor (MRCA) of two randomly chosen individual is T = t. Let us calculate the probability
PCA that they had a common ancestor one update step before. It could happen only if the parent and the dying
individuals were different, which happens with probability 1−1/N . Then our two individuals have a common ancestor
if one of them is the parent and the other is the newborn daughter, which has a probability 2 1N
1
N−1 . Hence having
a common ancestor in the previous update step is
PCA =
(
1− 1
N
)
· 2 · 1
N
· 1
N − 1 =
2
N2
(D1)
Consequently the probability that the MRCA is exactly time T = t backward is
Pr(T = t) = (1− PCA)t−1PCA =
(
1− 2
N2
)t−1 2
N2
(D2)
If we introduce a rescaled time τ = t/(N2/2), then in the N →∞ limit the coalescent time distribution (D2) converges
to the same density function (5) as we obtained for the W-F model.
Since in our model mutations (in strategies) and motion only happen at birth events, let us investigate the statistics
of birth events in the Moran model. As we follow the ancestral lines of two randomly chosen individuals backward
in time, we can obtain the probability PB that a birth event happens in one update step, but the ancestral lines do
not coalesce. In other words, PB is the probability that at a given time one of the two individuals is the daughter
but the other is not the parent. If the parent dies during this update step (which happens with probability 1/N)
one individual is the daughter with probability 2/N (and the other individual cannot be the parent). If the parent
does not die (which happens with probability 1− 1/N) one of the individuals is the daughter and the other is not the
parent with probability 2/N · (N − 2)/(N − 1). Hence the probability that there is a birth event in the ancestry of
either individual during one elementary time step is
PB =
(
1− 1
N
)
· 2
N
· N − 2
N − 1 +
1
N
· 2
N
=
2(N − 1)
N2
(D3)
In the continuous time limit with τ = t/(N2/2), a birth event happens at rate N . Consequently a mutation happens
at rate µ = Nu on the ancestral line of two individuals. Similarly, one of the two individual hops at rate ν = Nv
in each direction. In other words the distance between the two individuals changes at rate ν in each direction. This
means that the continuous time (N →∞) descriptions of the Moran and the W-F models are the same, but N must
be used for the Moran and 2N for the W-F model in the definition of µ and ν. Hence all N →∞ results of Section III
are also valid for the Moran model. (Note that the diffusion coefficient of the cluster is D = v/N .)
All formulas of Section IV are almost identical to those for W-F model. The average frequency of cooperators
depends on the change of cooperators very similarly to (34)
〈p〉 = 1
2
+N
1− u
u
〈∆p〉sel (D4)
Instead of the fitness of the W-F model (30), we have a very similar expression for the fitness after one elementary
step
wC,i =
N − 1
N
+
fC,i∑
j [mjfC,j + (nj −mj)fD,j ] (D5)
where the payoffs are again given by (29). Here the first term corresponds to the cooperator staying alive, and to
second to it being chosen for reproduction. In the δ → 0 limit (D5) becomes
wC,i = 1 +
δ
N
bmi − cni − b− c
N
∑
j
mjnj
+ O(δ2) (D6)
Note that this is exactly the fitness of the W-F process (32) with a scaled selection strength δ′ = δ/N . Hence all
results of Section IV, and in particular the citical b/c ratio (52) are also valid for the Moran model.
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APPENDIX E: GENERAL PAYOFF MATRIX
Instead of the payoff matrix (28) of the simplified Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, we study now a general payoff
matrix (
R S
T P
)
(E1)
A similar derivation to the one presented in Section IV leads to the condition for cooperation
(R− S)g + (S − P )z > (R− S − T + P )η + (S + T − 2P )h (E2)
in the N → ∞ limit, which is the analogous formula to (51). Here a new type of three point correlation must be
introduced
η = Pr(Sl = Sk = Sq, Xk = Xq) (E3)
In the ν →∞ and µ→ 0 limit the correlations are
z =
1
2
√
ν
g =
1
2
√
ν
(
1− µ
4
)
h =
1
2
√
ν
(
1− µ2 +
√
3
8
)
η =
1
2
√
ν
(
1− µ3 +
√
3
8
) (E4)
up to O(1/ν) and O(µ2) terms. Here z, g, and h were obtained as limits of the general expressions (12), (21), and (26)
respectively. The value of η was derived analogously to (25). By substituting these correlations into (E2) we finally
arrive at the general condition for cooperation
T − S < (R− P )(1 +
√
3) (E5)
For the simplified PD game (28) we recover (54) in the leading order.
For a non-degenerate payoff matrix, with the exchange of players R > P can always be achieved. Then under weak
selection one can define an equivalent matrix (
1 α
1 + β 0
)
(E6)
with only two parameters
α =
S − P
R− P , β =
T −R
R− P (E7)
In these variables the condition for cooperation (E5) becomes
β < α+
√
3 (E8)
which describes a straight threshold line in the (α, β) plane (see Figure 5).
In Figure 5 we show how this threshold line (E8) divides the (α, β) plane into a cooperative and a defective half
plane. Three regions, bounded by black lines, correspond to the “Snow drift”, the “Stag hunt” and the “Prisoner’s
dilemma” games. The blue straight lines on the (α, β) plane correspond to the following representative simplified
payoff matrixes
Snow drift
(
b− c/2 b− c
b 0
)
β = 1− α, with 0 < α < 1
Stag hunt
(
b− c −c
0 0
)
β = −1, with α < 0
Prisoner’s dilemma
(
b− c −c
b 0
)
β = −α, with α < 0
(E9)
Form the general condition (E5) we can deduce the condition for cooperation for these simplified games. There is
always cooperation in the simplified Snow drift game. Cooperation is favored in the simplified Stag hunt game only
for b/c > 1 + 1/(1 +
√
3). In the simplified PD game cooperators win for b/c > 1 + 2/
√
3 in agreement with (54).
19
FIG. 5: “Snow drift”, “Stag hunt” and “Prisoner’s dilemma” games correspond to three distinct regions in the (α, β) plane,
bounded by black lines. The red (thick) line (E8) marks the boundary between defection (yellow-shaded) and cooperation
(white). The blue (thicker dashed) lines depict the corresponding simplified payoff matrices.
APPENDIX F: RANDOMLY CHANGING PHENOTYPES
Here we replace the one-dimensional phenotype space with an infinite-dimensional phenotype space. We do not
model the number of dimensions explicitly, but simply assume that every mutation causes a jump to a new unique
phenotype. Now the only way that two individuals can have the same phenotype is if there are no phenotypic
mutations in their ancestry back to the time of their most recent common ancestor. This property is called identity by
descent in population genetics and this mutation model known as the infinitely-many-alleles, or simply infinite-alleles,
mutation model [56, 57].
Let v˜ be the probability that the phenotype of an offspring differs from that of its parent. Note that in the one-
dimensional model, there is a mutation probability of v in each direction. As before, in the limiting (N →∞) model
with time rescaled appropriately, the phenotypic mutation rate to two individuals is equal to ν. In the Wright-Fisher
model we have 2Nv˜ → ν (and Nv˜ → ν in the Moran model), where the arrows correspond to the limit N →∞. The
definition of µ = 2Nu in the Wright-Fisher model (µ = Nu in the Moran model) is the same as before.
Given a coalescence time τ between a pair of individuals,
ζ(τ) = e−ντ (F1)
is the probability that they have the same phenotype. Therefore, in the N →∞ limit, the correlations defined in (3)
become
z =
1
1 + ν
g =
1
2
(
1
1 + ν
+
1
1 + µ+ ν
)
h =
1
2
[
1
1 + ν
+
1
3 + µ+ ν
(
1
1 + ν
+
1
1 + µ
+
1
1 + µ+ ν
)] (F2)
The calculation goes analogously to that of Section III. The threshold parameters (51) for cooperation to be favored
becomes (
b
c
)∗
=
ν(3 + 2µ+ ν) + (1 + µ)(3 + µ)
ν(2 + µ+ ν)
(F3)
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FIG. 6: Exact threshold b/c ratio (F3) for randomly changing phenotypes for N → ∞. Cooperation is most favored in the
ν →∞ limit, where (b/c)∗ = 1. Note that the lines for finite values of ν are not straight.
This is plotted in Figure 6, which can be compared to the corresponding Figure 4 for the one-dimensional model.
Cooperation is most favored when ν is large because in this case two individuals that share the same phenotype
will almost surely have the same strategy. We have(
b
c
)∗
= 1 +
1 + µ
ν
+O(ν−2) (F4)
In the ν →∞ limit, (b/c)∗ = 1, i.e. cooperation is favored whenever the benefit b from cooperation is larger than the
cost c.
For general payoff matrices (E1), we restrict our calculation to the µ → 0 limit. The calculation is completely
analogous to that of Appendix E. First we calculate the three point correlation η, which is defined in (E3). Up to
first order in µ we obtain
η =
1
1 + ν
[
1− µ 9 + 7ν + 2ν
2
4(1 + ν)(3 + ν)
]
(F5)
Substituting this expression together with (F2) into the general condition (E2) for cooperation, we finally obtain
T − S < (R− P ) (1 + ν)(3 + 2ν)
3 + ν
(F6)
This result is valid for general values of ν. For ν → 0 condition (F6) becomes T − S < R − P , while in the ν → ∞
limit it is simply R > P .
By using the scaled variables α, β, introduced in (E6), condition (F6) is again a straight line in the (α, β) plane.
For ν → 0 there is no cooperation in the PD region (see this region in Figure 5), but for ν → ∞ the whole plane
corresponds to cooperation.
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